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WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Gov. Sarah Palin announced Friday that she will step down as Alaska's chief executive by the end of the month. She will not seek election to a second gubernatorial term in 2010.

Palin, a Republican, was elected governor in 2006. She was tapped as Arizona Sen. John McCain's vice presidential running mate last year.

Palin said she was transferring authority to Lt. Gov. Sean Parnell, who will be sworn in at the Governor's Picnic on July 25.

A Republican source close to her political team told CNN's John King that it was a "calculation" she made that "it was time to move on." The governor's "book deal and other issues" were "causing a lot of friction" in her home state, the source said, adding that he believes she is "mapping out a path to 2012."

As the 2008 Republican vice presidential nominee, Palin has been considered one of the front-runners for the GOP nomination in 2012. Her decision not to seek another term as governor is sure to stoke speculation that Palin is seriously eyeing a run for the White House.

In an interview last month with CNN's Wolf Blitzer, Palin said she was unsure about her re-election bid because she needed to focus on her state and her family.

"So, no decision yet on either 2010 or let alone 2012?" Blitzer asked.

"No decision that I'd want to announce today," Palin responded.

Palin catapulted on the national stage last August when McCain, the Republican presidential nominee, chose her as his running mate.

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Memorandum

To: William Myhill
From: Kenneth Hunt
Date: 5/26/2009
Re: Justice Sotomayor Opinions on ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and IDEA

Note: All are majority opinions authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor in the Court of Appeals unless otherwise noted.

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA):

Anthony v. City of New York, 339 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2003)
Plaintiff that has the qualified disability of downs syndrome alleged that when police officers entered her apartment without a warrant, seized her, and involuntarily hospitalized her in a psychiatric facility she was intentionally discriminated against by the City on the basis of her disability. The issue on appeal was whether the City had the necessary discriminatory intent for plaintiff to establish a prima facie claim under the ADA. The arresting officers perceived plaintiff as being disabled, testifying that they “thought she needed assistance because she appeared to be slow.” Nonetheless, plaintiff failed to establish that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor when the sergeant ordered that the arresting officers seize her. As such, the Court affirmed a grant of summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff’s claim of discrimination under Title II of the ADA.

EEOC v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 321 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2003) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
Plaintiff, job applicant, sued under the ADA alleging that Hunt discriminated against persons with disabilities when they refused to hire individuals that took certain prescribed medications. The majority held that plaintiff could not allege a prima facie claim of discrimination since “applicants perceived as unsuitable for position of over-the-road truck drivers were not perceived as substantially limited in major life activity of working”, a prima facie element under the ADA. In dissent, Justice Sotomayor argues that the EEOC has produced substantial evidence that Hunt regarded the applicants as substantially limited in the major life activity of working a broad range or class of jobs/activities (i.e. working as truck drivers in general, not just as long haul truckers). Further, the EEOC provided enough evidence to create a factual issue, and survive summary judgment, as to whether Hunt perceived the applicants as broadly limited in their ability to work as a truck driver, not merely unsuited to drive long distances on “irregular, stressful schedules”.

Parker v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 204 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 2000)
Plaintiff-employee sued under the ADA alleging that he was discharged on the basis of his disability after taking an extended leave from work. As a result of plaintiff’s short-term benefits running out, plaintiff filed for long-term benefits and Social Security. The issue on appeal was whether employee’s statements in applying for long-term benefits precluded a possible finding that plaintiff was able to work if given reasonable accommodation. The Court held that employee's statements in applications for long-term disability and Social Security benefits that he was “completely incapacitated” and “unable to work” would not preclude jury from finding that employee had ability to work with reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Thus plaintiff still was able to make a prima facie showing of the “essential functions” element of an ADA discrimination claim.

Norville v. Staten Island University Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, (2d Cir. 1999)
Plaintiff was terminated from her position at defendant’s hospital after taking an extending leave and refusing to accept different positions, one only being part-time, the other paying less in wages and benefits located at a different job site. The issue on appeal was whether these offers for other positions were reasonable accommodations. The Court held that reassignment does not constitute “reasonable accommodation” under the ADA where a position comparable to the employee's former placement is available for which the employee is qualified, but the employee instead is assigned to a position that “would involve a substantial diminution in salary, benefits, seniority or other advantages that she possessed in her former job.” Since the jury was not instructed with the proper legal definition of “reasonable accommodation,” the jury was unable fully to evaluate whether the hospital's offer of different positions satisfied its duty of accommodation under the ADA. The court’s error was not harmless, and prejudiced plaintiff, who had demonstrated the rest of the elements of her discrimination claim, and therefore the Court reversed the verdict in favor of defendant.

Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 970 F.Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d by New York State Bd. of Law Examiners v. Bartlett, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999).
The issue on appeal was whether plaintiff was disabled within the meaning of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and thus entitled to reasonable accommodations in taking the bar examination. While on the District Court for the Southern District of NY, Justice Sotomayor writing for the majority held that an applicant to the NY Bar was disabled under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Thus plaintiff was entitled to reasonable accommodations in taking the bar examination, as her learning disability substantially limited her in the major life activities of reading or learning, despite her history of self-accommodation that had allowed her to achieve average reading skills. Thus, defendant not providing accommodation constituted a violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.


Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA):

Mr. L. v. Sloan, 449 F.3d 405 (2d Cir. 2006)
Plaintiff-parent obtained desired result as the result of a settlement with the School District, and filed a lawsuit to obtain attorney’s fees as a prevailing party under the IDEA. The District Court ruled against plaintiff, and the issue on appeal was whether the parent of a child with a disability, who obtains a desired result through settlement, is a prevailing party to whom the district court could have awarded attorney's fees. The Court held that plaintiff was not a prevailing party that a district court had discretion to grant attorney’s fees.

Taylor v. Vermont Dept. of Educ., 313 F.3d 768 (2d Cir. 2002)
Biological, non-custodial mother brought claims against several defendants, including state department of education, under the IDEA seeking “an independent educational evaluation of the child” and “access to all of child's educational records”. The District Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Court held in relevant part that the mother lacked standing to demand a hearing under IDEA on the appropriateness of the school’s individualized education program for the child, since mother’s right to participate in educational decisions for her child have been revoked via the custodial agreement created previously in a court decree. However, on the record-access claims, the Court held that the allegations supported mother's IDEA records-access claim, since the mother retained the right to “reasonable information regarding the child's progress in school and her health and safety” in the Vermont court decree. Finally, the Court affirmed the District Court holding that the mother was exempted from exhaustion requirement of IDEA, since exhaustion of remedies in this case would be futile.

Murphy v. Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2002)
Plaintiffs, parents of a “child with a disability” under the IDEA, filed a lawsuit requesting that defendant school district pay for their child's tuition at a private school. The district court, applying the IDEA's “stay-put provisions”, held that the school district was obligated to pay for the schooling until the student’s placement was changed in accordance with the IDEA. The issue on appeal is whether the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims because they did not exhaust their administrative remedies. The Court held that that the district court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claim because the matter fell within a recognized exception to the requirement to exhaust remedies. This exception applies when, like in this case, the disabled student requires immediate interim relief during a lengthy administrative process. Moreover, since the case was factually similar to Bd. of Educ. v. Schutz, 290 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2002), the Court also affirmed the substantive ruling of the district court: that the school district was obligated to pay tuition for the student with a disability until his placement was changed pursuant to the IDEA.


Rehabilitation Act:

See Bartlett supra.

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